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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines whether the extent to which institutions and policies are market-oriented 
influences people’s thoughts on the competitive process. Through the use of country-level panel 
data, as well as a cross-sectional sensitivity analysis linking individual-level and country-level 
data, this paper examines the effects of general, and five different areas of, economic freedom 
on people’s views of competition. A central result, found in both analyses, is that a small 
government is associated with greater support for competition, although the effect is small. 
Furthermore, greater regulation of the economy is associated with an increase in one measure 
of country-level competition endorsement. There is also a negative and quite substantial 
relationship between the quality of the legal system and the percentage of people regarding 
competition as completely undesirable. Sound money further seems to be negatively associated 
with the share of people expressing a very strong competition endorsement, although the effect 
is small. Finally, at the individual-level, free trade seems to be negatively associated with 
competition endorsement among households in the lowest income decile in particular. The 
direction of causality is argued to go from economic freedom to views of competition in at least 
some of these cases. Since competition is widely considered a pivotal prerequisite for any 
modern market economy, this study can be seen as a contribution to the broader understanding 
of people’s support for, or opposition against, the capitalist economy in general. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Competition is a prevalent feature of any modern market economy. Co-workers compete for 
promotion, companies compete for customers and applicants compete for jobs. According to 
Bowles, Edwards & Roosevelt (2005, p. 54), competition refers to those ‘‘aspects of economic 
relationships in which voluntary exchange and choice among a large number of possible buyers 
and sellers play the predominant role.’’ Competition has also been defined as the ‘‘formally 
peaceful’’ process by which actors try to obtain advantages also wanted by other actors (see 
Hayward & Kemmelmeier 2007, p. 368). Although economists may debate to what extent such 
competition is desirable in certain areas of the economy, for instance in the education sector 
(see Vlachos 2012), they generally view competition as a pivotal prerequisite for a dynamic 
market economy (Mankiw 2012; Stiglitz 2001). For instance, Mankiw (2012) writes that 
‘‘[s]ince the days of Adam Smith, economists have understood that the invisible hand of the 
marketplace works only if producers of goods and services vie with one another’’ and that this 
competition ‘‘keeps prices low and provides an incentive to improve and innovate.’’  
Competition can also be contrasted with cooperation, and the dilemma of competition versus 
cooperation can be seen as basically a question of caring for ‘‘me’’ versus caring for ‘‘we’’ 
(Loch, Galunic & Schneider 2006). Viewed in this way, it can be argued that neoclassical 
economics occasionally overestimate the importance of competition for progress, since it is 
often important for people to cooperate, i.e. refrain from competing, with each other for an 
organization to be successful (Bowles, Edwards & Roosevelt 2005, p. 50). Nevertheless, few 
economists would deny the importance and desirability of competition in the modern market 
economy. Although companies often cooperate in various accepted ways, most societies have 
competition laws in order to protect against monopolization (Magnusson 2009, pp. 72-74). 
While the reasons for economists’ favorable view of competition may seem quite clear, it may 
also be of interest to understand what predicts the views of people in general. This is especially 
true if one accepts the notion that ‘‘competition is the underpinning of the market economy, 
and the success of any market economy is contingent on the acceptance of the principles of 
competition’’ (Hayward & Kemmelmeier 2007, p. 365).  
Institutions can be thought of as the ‘‘rules’’ of the economy. They can be either formal, like 
legislation, or informal, such as norms (Magnusson 2009, pp. 68-69). Is there a (causal) 
connection between market-oriented institutions and policies favoring competition, and 
people’s thoughts on competition? Since institutions and policies can be changed, this question 
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may be of interest to policymakers trying to increase public support for the competitive process. 
Examining this question may also contribute to the understanding of the reasons behind 
people’s support for, or opposition against, the capitalist economy in general. Following 
Gwartney, Lawson & Hall (2012), ‘‘economic freedom’’ is defined as being present when 
actors are free to participate and compete in the marketplace, when their property rights are 
protected, and when there is great scope for choice and voluntary exchange through markets. 
This paper examines if the extent of economic freedom, as measured by the Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom of the World Index, affects people’s views of competition. 
To the author’s knowledge, this paper is unique in examining the relationship between five 
separate areas of economic freedom and people’s competition endorsement. The study 
estimates a fixed effects model using country-level panel data, and also includes a sensitivity 
analysis using OLS on a cross section of linked individual-level and country-level data. The 
main result, found both in the main analysis as well as the sensitivity analysis, is that a larger 
government is associated with a lower support for competition. Heavier regulation of the 
economy further seems to be associated with a greater percentage of people leaning towards or 
completely embracing the view that competition is good, and there is a negative and substantial 
relationship between the quality of the legal system and the percentage of people viewing 
competition as completely undesirable. Furthermore, sound money seems to be negatively 
associated with the share of people expressing a very strong competition endorsement, although 
the effect is small. Finally, at the individual level free trade seems to be negatively associated 
with the support for competition among individuals from low-income households in particular. 
The direction of causality is argued to go from economic freedom to people’s views of 
competition in at least a few of these cases. 
Section 2 presents a short overview of the earlier research on the relationship between the 
economy and people’s values and preferences, and then a theoretical discussion about the 
specific relationships of interest in this paper can be found in section 3. Section 4 presents the 
data used in this paper, and section 5 the choice of method. In section 6 the results are presented 
together with a sensitivity analysis. Finally, section 7 consists of a concluding discussion. 
References can be found in section 8 and the Appendix in section 9. 
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2 EARLIER RESEARCH 
Before proceeding with the question of why one would expect a relationship between the 
economic institutions and policies of a country and people’s views of competition, a brief 
review of the research on the origins and causes of people’s personalities, values and 
preferences2 might be useful. 
According to Loch, Galunic & Schneider (2006), human evolution has given rise to inherited 
‘‘emotional algorithms’’ that direct people to compete or cooperate. The idea that people 
possess innate capabilities for both cooperation and competition seems consistent with the 
experimental evidence suggesting that most individuals may act selfishly under some economic 
circumstances but may be concerned about ‘‘fair’’ outcomes in others. For instance Fehr, Naef 
& Schmidt (2006, p. 1912) summarize the research on social preferences by concluding that ‘‘a 
large majority of subjects behaves as if completely self-interested in some circumstances, such 
as in competitive experimental markets with standardized goods or in the final rounds of public 
goods experiments; while in other circumstances a large majority behaves as if strongly 
motivated by fairness concerns, e.g., in competitive markets with incomplete contracts or in 
public goods experiments with punishment opportunities.’’ Bowles (2012, p. 131-145) further 
explores the experimental evidence and suggests a reconsideration of Homo economicus, the 
completely selfish actor often imagined in economic theory (but less common in real life).3 
Loch, Galunic & Schneider (2006, p. 230) further argue that the innate ‘‘emotional algorithms’’ 
behind cooperative and competitive behavior among humans are connected to, and often work 
through, culture. While genetics plays a role in shaping preferences, so does learning (Bowles 
1998, p. 79). A very simple example of this is the quite universal taste for fatty and sweet food, 
which is probably genetically determined, while the fact that Italians often prefer pasta may be 
better explained by culture (Bowles, Edwards & Roosevelt 2005, p. 41). And despite the 
important role of genes, people’s personalities are not set in stone. For instance, there is 
evidence that personality traits can be altered, for example through interventions during early 
childhood or adolescence (Heckman & Kautz 2012, pp. 460-61).  
                                                          
2 Bowles (1998, p. 78-79) defines ‘’preferences’’ as ‘’reasons for behaviors, that is, attributes of individuals that 
(along with their beliefs and capacities) account for the actions they take in a given situation’’, acquired both 
through ‘’genetic inheritance and learning’’. 
3 Interestingly, the experimental evidence in Fehr, Naef & Schmidt (2006) shows that the behavior of 
economists differs from noneconomist. Maybe the presence of Homo economicus in economics courses plays a 
role in this? 
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Thus, individuals are formed both by genes and culture. Accordingly, the empirical evidence 
shows that the way people think and behave is related to the economy in which they live and 
act. On average, participants in cooperative production (for instance, whale hunters 
collaborating in large teams) seem to care more about ‘‘fairness’’ when taking part in economic 
experiments such as the ultimatum game, when compared to people with a background in more 
individualized production (Bowles, Edwards & Roosevelt 2005, pp. 43-46). There is also 
evidence that differences in the economic structure of societies are associated with differences 
in child-rearing (Barry, Child & Bacon 1959). Furthermore, a family’s position in the social 
hierarchy and the extent of self-direction on the job seem to affect the values of parents and, in 
turn, their children, and there seems to be a causal influence going from occupation to 
personality (Kohn et al. 1986; Bowles 1998, p. 98). There is also evidence that more market 
integration4 is associated with larger average offers in the dictator and ultimatum games 
(Henrich et al. 2010). An earlier study found similar results (summarized in Bowles, Edwards 
& Roosevelt 2005, pp. 43-46). Furthermore, using detailed data from the US, Francois, 
Fujiwara & van Ypersele (2009) found that ‘‘working in a competitive environment builds 
trust’’. 
 
Bowles, Edwards & Roosevelt (2005, pp. 42, 46-47) conclude that ‘‘the economy produces 
more than just goods and services; it also produces people’’ and that ‘‘[e]conomic institutions 
shape people’s preferences in part because institutions determine what kinds of individuals will 
be successful, and people try to copy the successful.’’ For instance, an industrial worker in a 
market economy must be willing to follow orders while a hunter in a forager group must be 
independent (Bowles, Edwards & Roosevelt 2005, p. 46). The idea that certain kinds of 
individuals are generally more successful is supported by the increasing body of evidence 
showing that certain personality traits, preferences and motivations (so called ‘‘soft skills’’) are 
highly valuable in the labor market (and other areas) and produce success in life (Heckman & 
Kautz 2012). Furthermore, there is evidence that schools reward many of the personality traits 
preferred by employers (Bowles, Edwards & Roosevelt 2005, pp. 47).  
It is important to bear in mind that while causality may go from economic institutions to 
preferences and values, it may also go the opposite way: Norms, preferences and values may 
simultaneously influence and be influenced by economic structures. For instance, certain norms 
                                                          
4 The measure of market integration used in the Henrich et al. (2010) study is the percentage of the 
household’s calories that are not homegrown or hunted but bought in the marketplace.  
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and values may be helpful when establishing functioning market institutions. Bowles (1998, p. 
92) writes that ‘‘where contracts are incomplete or unenforceable, trustworthiness and other 
norms facilitate exchange.’’ Accordingly, there is evidence suggesting that culture may affect 
the economy (see Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales 2006).  
As already mentioned, this paper will focus on the specific relationship between the extent of 
market-friendly economic institutions and policies (i.e. the degree of economic freedom) on the 
one hand, and people’s views on whether competition is desirable on the other. The existing 
economic freedom literature includes many studies on the relationship between economic 
growth and economic freedom (see for example Heckelman 2000 and Doucouliagos 2005). But 
there are also studies on the relationship between economic freedom and people’s values and 
views. For instance, Berggren & Nilsson (2013) investigated whether economic freedom fosters 
tolerance, and found a positive relationship with tolerance towards homosexuals. They used 
central-bank independence and hyperinflation as instruments and interpreted the relationship as 
causal, pointing out that ‘‘[t]he time dimension in the first-difference results as well as the 
instrumental variable analysis for the cross-sectional results, indicate that the relationship 
between economic freedom and tolerance towards homosexuals can probably be regarded as 
causal: economic freedom indeed appears to foster tolerance’’ (Berggren & Nilsson 2013, p. 
200). Berggren & Jordahl (2006) further encountered relationships between economic freedom 
and trust (using legal origin as an instrument). In particular, legal structure and the protection 
of property rights (the second area of the index also used in this paper), seemed to play a 
significant role in predicting trust. These results suggest that economic freedom may help 
explain the way people think.  
Of greater interest for the purposes of this paper, Hayward & Kemmelmeier (2007) explored 
the many factors associated with people’s endorsement of competition. To the author’s 
knowledge their paper is the only existing study examining the specific relationship between 
economic freedom and people’s views of competition. The authors found a negative 
relationship between the two variables, concluding that ‘‘market freedom is associated with 
lower levels of endorsement of competition’’ (Hayward & Kemmelmeier 2007, p. 382). While 
certainly an interesting result, one should note that this was a cross-sectional country-level 
association found between a summary index of economic freedom and people’s mean 
endorsement of competition, without controlling for such important variables as GDP (see 
Hayward & Kemmelmeier 2007, p. 392, footnote 3). It is plausible that these factors could 
affect their result. Therefore this paper includes GDP as a control variable, as well as various 
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dependent variables (not only mean endorsement of competition, which could be quite 
misleading5) and further includes regression results using five separate areas of economic 
freedom in addition to results using a summary index. Thus, this paper will follow in the 
footsteps of the Hayward & Kemmelmeier (2007) study, but will focus specifically on 
economic freedom, and will use different methods as well as a different index of economic 
freedom.6 This paper is also more detailed in the sense that it includes expanded data with a 
longitudinal dimension, allowing for correlation between time-invariant unobserved factors and 
the independent variables through fixed effects estimation (see section 5 for a more detailed 
discussion). It further includes additional control variables, as well as a sensitivity analysis of 
a cross-section of country-level economic freedom together with individual-level data. 
 
3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
To summarize, there seems to be some truth to the idea that ‘‘the economy produces people’’, 
and there is evidence that economic freedom affects how people think. The measure of 
economic freedom used in this paper is the Economic Freedom of the World index from the 
Fraser Institute and its constituent five areas (see section 4.2 and Gwartney, Lawson & Hall 
2012 for more details). This paper therefore follows Berggren & Nilsson (2013, pp. 181-187) 
in first discussing economic freedom in general, i.e. the summary index, and then the five 
separate areas of the economic freedom index. Partly because of the lack of earlier studies, the 
theoretical discussion is not particularly advanced or well-developed. But, as in the 
abovementioned studies on the relationship between economic freedom and tolerance 
(Berggren & Nilsson 2013), and economic freedom and trust (Berggren & Jordahl 2006), the 
reasoning should be fairly straightforward. 
If the widespread use of markets as an allocation mechanism fosters greed and selfishness7 (see 
Hirschman 1982; Berggren & Nilsson 2013, p. 181) and entails market failures, then it is 
possible that people might come to view the competitive process as the culprit. On the other 
                                                          
5 See the discussion in section 4.1. 
6 i.e. the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index (see section 4.2). 
7 This idea is in line with classical Marxist claims about the effects of capitalism, asserting that it entails 
‘‘universal venality’’ and ‘‘general corruption’’, since it allows for all things, including love, to be traded for 
money (Marx [1847] 2008, pp. 86-87). However, as suggested by the empirical evidence reviewed in section 2, 
the use of markets does not seem to be associated with less generosity (see again Henrich et al. 2010; Bowles, 
Edwards & Roosevelt 2005, pp. 43-46). Gintis (2012) further conclude that ‘‘[t]he notion that the market 
economy makes people greedy, selﬁsh, and amoral is simply fallacious’’ and that ‘‘[t]olerance, equality, and 
democracy have flourished in market societies and nowhere else.’’ 
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hand, if greater use of market institutions and the market process increases personal choice, for 
instance between products and employers, and further promotes empathy and social bonds 
between companies and their customers (see Hirschman 1982, p. 1472), then people may come 
to view competition as a force for good.  
Furthermore, if a competitive attitude is necessary for success in a market-oriented society and 
if ‘‘people try to copy the successful’’ (Bowles, Edwards & Roosevelt 2005, p. 47), this may 
lead people in market-oriented societies to embrace competition. In line with the research 
reviewed earlier, parents in market societies may transfer competitive values to their children 
and schools may further reward and foster (competitive) personality traits and attitudes 
necessary for success in the economy.8 
In societies with less or no dependence on markets, the benefits of competition may not be as 
visible. As suggested by Berggren & Nilsson (2013, p. 184), ‘‘[i]n a setting with no or weak 
market institutions, where the market process is not very developed, the group depends on its 
own production capacity to obtain the goods and services its members need and desire. In such 
a closed, autarkic setting, there is a strong tendency to meddle and to control people’s lives: 
what they do concerns everybody.’’ In such ‘‘closed’’ societies, competition may be perceived 
as eroding ‘‘positive social ties’’ (Hayward & Kemmelmeier 2007, p. 364), dividing the group 
or network and undermining the cohesion necessary for survival. The idea that competition 
should be widely endorsed in market-friendly societies but not as widely endorsed in less 
market-oriented societies has been summarized in the following (quite blunt) way: ‘‘A belief 
that competition is virtuous supports and helps to justify the excesses of free-market capitalist 
economies but threatens the stability of more closed systems; thus, competition should come to 
be broadly endorsed in places with free markets and distrusted in places with closed markets’’ 
(Hayward & Kemmelmeier 2007, p. 367).9  
                                                          
8 It has also been suggested that endorsing competition as a desirable and fair process could bring further 
psychological advantages to people in market-societies since it may reduce ‘‘existential anxiety by facilitating 
the belief that the world is just and fair’’ (Hayward & Kemmelmeier 2007, p. 367). 
9 This is quite consistent with the Marxist assertion that the predominant values and ideology of a (capitalist) 
society is shaped by the existing economic power structures, and further that these dominant values tend to 
reinforce existing economic relationships in a way that benefits the powerful (i.e. the capitalist class) of society 
(Marx [1932] 2003, pp. 109-116; Hayward & Kemmelmeier 2007, p. 366). This view has been summarized as 
implying that ‘‘in a society driven by free-market capitalism, competition between individuals and between 
products benefits the capitalist class and therefore comes to be embraced on an ideological level by the 
general public’’, something which is supposed to be equally true in other types of economies; ‘‘people are 
expected to value obedience in a slave economy, hierarchy in a feudal economy, and so forth’’ (Hayward & 
Kemmelmeier 2007, p. 366). 
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As already pointed out above, causality may go from the economy to values, but it may also go 
the opposite way: Norms, values and preferences may simultaneously shape and be shaped by 
economic structures and policies. It is plausible that a widespread endorsement of competition 
may facilitate the rise and stability of market-friendly institutions and policies (i.e. economic 
freedom). This is consistent with the alleged existence of quite stable cultural traits with 
historical roots influencing people’s views of competition which, in turn, shape economic 
policies and institutions (Hayward & Kemmelmeier 2007, p. 366).  
In summary, while the expected relationship might not be perfectly clear, especially in light of 
the findings reported by Hayward & Kemmelmeier (2007, p. 382) and discussed in the previous 
section, most of the abovementioned ideas lend support to the hypothesis that more overall 
economic freedom should be associated with greater endorsement of competition.  
So far only general economic freedom has been discussed. But what about the separate areas of 
the economic freedom index used in this paper? Together with a short description of the five 
areas, this is briefly discussed below, inspired to some degree by the reasoning in Berggren & 
Jordahl (2006, p. 147-148) and Berggren & Nilsson (2013, p. 185-187), but (of course) adapted 
to the context and dependent variable(s) of this paper. Again, the discussion is not particularly 
comprehensive, and the net effect on people’s views on competition seems unclear throughout 
many of these various areas, underlining the need for empirical examination and further 
suggesting that the previous discussion about overall economic freedom might not suffice. 
- Size of government, measuring the degree to which the allocation of goods, services and 
resources goes through government (instead of through the market). A higher score means more 
dependence on markets and less dependence on government. The effect on people’s 
competition endorsement might depend on what the government spends money on. For 
instance, if government spending corrects market failures and protects people against the 
downsides of competition (for instance through generous unemployment benefits), or makes 
competition ‘‘fair’’ by subsidizing education for the less well-off, people may come to view 
competition as basically a fair and desirable process. On the other hand, it is possible that greater 
government allocation of resources tend to change the nature of competition and make its 
possible advantages less visible. Competition for government resources may not be seen as a 
productive force for good in the same way as competition for, let’s say, customers in a market. 
In societies with greater government control over resource allocation, people may tend to 
associate competition with trying to get first in the queue for a government subsidized apartment 
or with interest groups competing for government support, instead of companies competing for 
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customers in a market through innovation and the improvement of products. Overall, the 
expected net effect of the size of government is unclear. 
- Legal system & property rights. Measures the quality of the legal system and the protection 
of people and their property rights. Includes components such as the impartiality of the courts 
and contract enforcement. When courts are impartial, property rights are protected and when 
contracts are enforced, it is plausible that people may come to see competition as generally a 
fair and productive process.  If, on the other hand, the legal system is discriminatory and actors 
are not confident that their property rights will be protected, the possible advantages of 
competition (and the market economy in general) may become less visible, and people may 
come to see the process of competition between people or companies (and the ensuing outcome) 
as unfair, which may possibly affect their views on the desirability of competition in general. 
Thus, a positive effect is expected. 
- Sound Money, measuring things such as the absence of inflation and the ease by which people 
may access foreign currency. As suggested by Berggren & Nilsson (2013, p. 186), ‘‘high and 
variable inflation tends to redistribute wealth in a manner which may be perceived as unfair and 
which may therefore cause tension in society.’’ While not totally clear, it is possible that when 
people feel insecure about something as fundamental as the value of money, the possible 
advantages of the market economy might not be as visible, which may make people less 
supportive of competition. If so, a positive association is expected.  
- Freedom to trade. Measures the absence of barriers to voluntary exchange over national 
borders, such as tariffs, controls on the mobility of capital etc. If free trade and the associated 
competition from abroad10 is perceived as threatening the jobs of natives, then this may affect 
people’s competition endorsement in a negative way (especially among the groups particularly 
affected, such as low-wage workers). On the other hand, if free trade and competition from 
abroad increase choice the opposite effect is possible. Or both may be possible, but for different 
groups of society. Thus, the net effect is unclear. 
- Regulation, measuring the absence of regulation of credit, business and labor such as, for 
instance, regulations on the firing of people, bureaucratic costs and restrictions on the rates of 
interest. Greater regulation of the economy might strengthen people’s support for competition 
if it corrects market failures and protects people from the more unpleasant aspects of market 
competition (for instance through firing regulations) and if it limits deceptive and bad behavior 
                                                          
10 For instance, ‘‘cheap imports’’ produced by foreign low-wage workers. 
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among market actors. But regulation might also possibly undermine people’s support for 
competition if it tends to protect powerful interests and make competition ‘‘unfair’’ in the eyes 
of the public. Again, the net effect is not totally clear.  
 
As briefly discussed in the previous section, reverse causality may arise in many (maybe all) of 
these cases. For instance, higher support for competition may lead to less regulation or a smaller 
government. Similarly, a low support for competition could lead to restrictions on imports from 
abroad, and so on. These possibilities are discussed later. 
Finally, because of the inclusion of four different dependent variables in this paper (see section 
4.1), the predicted relationship between economic freedom and competition endorsement would 
of course manifest itself in different ways depending on which dependent variable is used. But 
since the meaning of these four variables are quite straightforward (again, see section 4.1), this 
should not pose any problem for the reader. 
 
4 DATA 
The main study in this paper is based on country-level panel data. In other words, this is an 
examination of country aggregates with a time dimension, examining the various relationships 
between explanatory variables such as the overall degree of economic freedom in a country and 
various country-level measures of people’s views of competition.  
The data on the dependent variables are taken from the World Values Survey & European 
Values Study Group (2013). The survey data are from between 1989-1993 (denoted ‘‘wave 1’’ 
throughout this paper), 1994-1998 (wave 2), 1999-2002 (wave 3), and 2004-2007 (wave 4). 
Thus, the data from every survey wave were collected during a period of a few years. Therefore 
the data were ‘‘matched’’ with regard to the dependent and independent variables with the 
intention that for every wave, all of the data for every country on all variables should be from 
the same year. For instance, if data on the dependent variable for Spain in wave 3 are from the 
year 2000 then the data on inequality and economic freedom (see below) are also from the year 
2000. However, because of a major lack of data for some years, this is not always the case. 
Some of the data on economic freedom are from different years than the rest of the variables, 
but the difference is mostly just one year.  
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The panel data set is unbalanced, with many countries having missing data for some time 
periods. It is hard to think of any obvious reason why the cause of the missing data should be 
correlated with the time-changing unobserved factors itu (see section 5.1), and so it seems 
reasonable to assume no serious problem with using this unbalanced panel (Wooldridge 2013, 
p. 473). 
 
4.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
I include four dependent variables, each providing a measure of people’s views of competition. 
The data for all dependent variables are calculated from people’s responses to the following 
question in the widely used World Values Survey and European Values Study: 
‘‘How would you place your views of this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the 
statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if 
your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.’’ 
 
Source: World Values Survey 2013 
All data were collected and computed from the World Values Survey online database (World 
Values Survey & European Values Study Group 2013). The first dependent variable is 
computed by taking the mean of all responses for each country. This variable was reverse coded, 
so that a higher value implies more positive views of competition. One reason why the mean 
could be quite misleading is the fact that just calculating the mean of the responses in a 
particular country means that a country with a divided population (50% responding 1 and 50% 
responding 10 in the extreme case) would have a mean similar to that of a country with 
responses concentrated around 5 and 6. Thus, in order to get more information out of the data, 
the percentage of people responding 1 and the percentage of people responding 10 were 
included as additional dependent variables. These two variables should be good indicators of 
the share of people expressing entirely positive and entirely negative views of competition 
respectively. There should be almost no ambiguity when interpreting the meaning of these two 
variables, since the answer 1 should imply that a person thinks that there is only good things to 
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say about competition and the answer 10 should imply that there is only bad things to say. 
Finally, this study also includes as a dependent variable the percentage of people in each country 
responding 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, i.e. the percentage of people ‘‘leaning’’ towards or completely 
agreeing with the view that ‘‘Competition is good’’.11 
To summarize, these are the four included dependent variables: 
- Mean views of competition. The mean response to the question in each country. Recoded so 
that a higher mean implies more positive views of competition. 
- Competition is mostly good. The percentage of people responding 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, i.e. that 
competition is more desirable than it is undesirable.  
- Competition is good. The percentage of people responding that competition is as desirable as 
it can possibly get, i.e. giving the response 1. 
- Competition is bad. The percentage of people responding that competition is as undesirable 
as it can possibly get, i.e. giving the response 10. 
It is clear from just glancing at the data that people are generally quite supportive of 
competition, with the mean share of people responding 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, i.e. that competition is 
more desirable than it is undesirable, being as high as 80.61 percent across all countries and 
time periods (see Table A1 in the Appendix).  
 
4.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The explanatory variables of interest are described below: 
- Economic Freedom. As an independent variable measuring the extent to which an economy 
is free from government intervention and involvement and the extent to which there is scope 
for free markets, this paper makes use of data from the Economic Freedom of the World index 
from the Fraser Institute (Fraser Institute 2012). Because of the panel data structure, the chain-
linked data recommended for longitudinal studies is used (Gwartney, Lawson & Hall 2012, pp. 
15, 26). Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom index is used quite widely in research and has 
several advantages, of which its transparency and the non-arbitrariness of using the five areas 
can be taken as an example (Berggren & Nilsson 2013, pp. 187-188). It consists of forty-two 
                                                          
11 Of course one could just as well have included the percentage of people leaning towards or completely 
agreeing with the view that ‘‘Competition is bad’’ by responding 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10. 
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variables, and five areas of economic freedom (for a more detailed description of the index and 
its five areas, see Gwartney, Lawson & Hall 2012, pp. 3-9). Each variable can take on values 
from 0 to 10, implying no or full economic freedom, respectively. As already discussed in 
greater detail in section 3, the five areas of economic freedom are: 
- Size of government.  
- Legal system & property rights.  
- Sound Money.  
- Freedom to trade. 
- Regulation.  
In addition to regressions including the summary index, regressions using these five separate 
areas of the summary index as independent variables are also included throughout this paper.  
 
4.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
In addition to the main explanatory variables of interest, several control variables are included, 
all described below: 
 
- GDP per capita. Following the discussion in Hayward & Kemmelmeier (2007, p. 369-371), 
it seemed reasonable to control for a possible relationship between economic development and 
people’s endorsement of competition. It is possible that the public becomes either less or more 
supportive of competition as countries grow richer. The first idea suggests that people in 
undeveloped societies tend to care more about basic needs, and thus value competition more 
since it is essential for survival. According to this views, as countries become richer people tend 
to care more about ‘‘soft’’ things such as the environment, justice and other ‘‘post-material’’ 
values, and less about competition. The second idea suggests the opposite: People become more 
selfish and competitive following technological and economic development and the associated 
erosion of the traditional community. Thus, the net effect is unclear. 
The measure of per capita income used in this study is PPP converted GDP per capita at 2005 
constant prices from The Center for International Comparisons of Production (Heston, 
Summers & Aten 2012). Since the value is a positive amount measured in dollars, this study 
follow the rules of thumb of Wooldridge (2013, p. 185) and take the natural logarithm of this 
variable.  
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- Net Gini. It also seemed reasonable to control for the possibility that inequality might weaken 
people’s support for markets and competition (if people see markets and competition as the 
culprits behind this inequality). As the inequality variable, the Gini index of net income 
inequality from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2009) is used. 
- Education. When examining the effects of economic freedom on trust, Berggren & Jordahl 
(2006) include the share of people who has completed secondary school as a control variable. 
This study similarly include as a control Barro & Lee’s (2010) estimates of the average years 
of total schooling among the population aged 15 and over. Borrowing from the discussion 
regarding GDP, education may lower people’s support for competition if it generally makes 
people care more about ‘‘soft’’ values, but other effects might also be possible (for instance, if 
education fosters a competitive mindset among children and students). 
- Trust. As mentioned earlier, Berggren & Jordahl (2006) found a connection between economic 
freedom and trust. There is a possibility that trust might also be associated with people’s views 
of competition. For instance, if people trust each other, including the various actors of the 
market, then they may come to see competition as generally a force for good. If, on the other 
hand, they do not generally trust other people, then they may expect actors in the market to act 
deceptively, and thus show less support for competition. Conversely, it might also be possible 
that people in low trust societies react in the opposite way by forming a competitive attitude as 
a defense strategy against perceived deceptive and untrustworthy strangers, thus possibly 
showing greater support for acting competitively. Regardless of which is the most plausible net 
effect, it seemed reasonable to control for trust levels in society and thus this study includes a 
control variable measuring the percentage of the population responding that ‘‘most people can 
be trusted’’ to the World Values Survey question about trust, calculated from the World Values 
Survey & European Values Study Group (2013) online database.  
 
4.4 TIME DUMMY VARIABLES 
In order to account for aggregate changes over time that are not otherwise included in the model, 
time dummy variables for each survey wave are included, with wave number 1 acting as the 
omitted category. 
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5 CHOICE OF METHOD 
As already mentioned, the data structure used in this paper is panel data, also called longitudinal 
data, i.e. a cross section of countries (in this study) with a time-series for every country 
(Wooldridge 2013, pp. 10-11). In other words, one examines a group of countries over a period 
of years. One major advantage of using panel data instead of a simple cross section is that it 
makes it possible to control for time-invariant characteristics that are unobserved (see the 
discussion below).  
There are two major ways of fitting panel data models: Random effects and fixed effects 
regression. Since the sample in this study cannot be seen as a random sample from the whole 
population of countries in the world, the author follows the recommendations of Dougherty 
(2011, pp. 525-527) and use fixed effects estimation (instead of random effects).12 Furthermore, 
in contrast to random effects (or simple OLS), fixed effects allows for the time-invariant 
unobserved factors affecting the dependent variable, captured by i a in (1) below, to be correlated 
with the independent variables (Wooldridge 2013, pp. 477-478). Thus, it could be a good idea 
to use fixed effects (instead of random effects or OLS) in this study. For instance, it is quite 
possible that some unobserved time-constant cultural characteristic of a country (captured by
i a ), which is affecting people's attitudes towards competition (the dependent variable), might 
be correlated with the overall degree of economic freedom (one of the main explanatory 
variables).  
While the fixed effects method used in this paper allows for correlation between the 
independent variables and those unobserved factors that do not change over time, it should be 
noted that the idiosyncratic errors itu  in (1) below, i.e. the unobserved factors that do change 
over time and affect people’s views on competition, should be uncorrelated with the 
independent variables over every time period (Wooldridge 2013, p. 467, 490). Thus, although 
time dummy variables are included, and while time-constant unobserved factors are eliminated 
(see the discussion below), it might still be possible that some omitted variable that change over 
time (captured by itu  in (1) below) affects both economic freedom and people’s views of 
competition. 
 
                                                          
12 For instance, there is an overrepresentation of OECD-countries in the data (see Table A3 in the Appendix). 
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5.1 MODEL 
Consider the model, 
iti itkitittttit uaxxxd4d3d2y  k22112100 ...βββ ,    (1) 
with k independent variables, where t indicates the time period, and i denotes the country, and 
d2, d3 and d4 are time dummy variables,13 d2 taking on the value of 1 when t = 2 and 0 otherwise 
etc. This is often called an unobserved effects model. The dependent variable ity  is affected 
by unobserved factors, which consists of factors that do not change over time, captured by i a , 
and factors that do change over time, captured by itu  (Wooldridge 2013, p. 443-444).  
Panel data are often collected in order to allow correlation between i a (the unobserved effect) 
and the independent variables (Wooldridge 2013, p. 445). One way to allow this is through the 
fixed effects (within) estimator, which is used in this study. The fixed effects estimator makes 
use of a transformation in order to eliminate i a before estimation (Wooldridge 2013, p. 466-
467).  
Consider (1) above. The fixed effects (within) estimator is obtained by taking the average of 
equation (1) over time for every i, and then removing i a  by subtracting the obtained average 
equation from (1) for every t. Then a so called time-demeaned equation is obtained, and the 
fixed effects (within) estimator implies using pooled OLS on these time-demeaned variables. 
Time-demeaning is thus used on all explanatory variables and pooled OLS is used on the time-
demeaned variables.  
Thus, one makes use of the variation in the dependent and independent variables through time 
‘‘within’’ every cross-sectional observation. Every independent variable that (for all i) does not 
change over time is removed by this fixed effects transformation, which implies that time-
constant explanatory variables cannot be included. The intercept is also removed by the 
transformation (for more details, see Wooldridge 2013, pp. 466-468). 
  
                                                          
13 In this study for Wave 2, 3 and 4 respectively, which is why (1) includes three such time dummy variables. 
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5.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DISCUSSION 
The models below were used in this study: 
it i uadWave4
dWave3dWave2  EducationTrustGini_netlogGDPppp Regulation
radeFreedomtoTSoundMoneymLegalSysteSizeofGovnViewsCompetitio



3
2198765
43210 ββββ
 
it i uadWave4dWave3dWave2
EducationTrustGini_netlogGDPpppEFSummarynViewsCompetitio


321
543210 ββ
 
Below is an overview of the included variables: 
 
- CompetitionViews = In the depiction above, the four different dependent variables, Mean 
views of competition, Competition is mostly good, Competition is good and Competition is bad 
(already described in section 4.1) are all simply summarized under the common name 
CompetitionViews. 
- EFSummary = The summary index of economic freedom. 
- SizeofGov = Size of Government. 
- LegalSystem = Legal System & Property Rights. 
- SoundMoney = Sound Money. 
- FreedomtoTrade = Freedom To Trade. 
- Regulation = Regulation. 
- logGDPppp = The natural logarithm of PPP Converted GDP per capita at 2005 constant prices. 
- Gini_net = The Gini index of net income inequality. 
- Trust = The percentage of the population believing that ‘‘most people can be trusted’’. 
- Education = Average years of total schooling among the population aged 15 and over. 
- Wave2, 3 and 4 = Dummy variables for the time periods (i.e. the four included survey waves 
of the World Values Survey & European Values Study Group), with time period 1 as reference 
category. 
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-  ia is the unobserved effect, while itu is the idiosyncratic error. 
The initial intention was to include values on the independent variables from an earlier year 
than the dependent variable. But since data on the various independent variables were not 
always available for the years before the survey data on the dependent variable, and in order to 
avoid losing lots of observations, this idea was dropped.  
The correlations between the independent variables were studied in order to see if 
multicollinearity could be detected. According to the rule of thumb suggested by Westerlund 
(2005, p. 160), a correlation greater than 0,8 would be a problem. None of the obtained 
correlations were greater than 0,8.  
One of the assumptions for fixed effects estimation is that the idiosyncratic errors (the time-
varying errors, representing unobserved factors that change over time and affect the dependent 
variable) are normally distributed. If this is the case then F and t statistics have exact F and t 
distributions. Without this assumption, a large N and small T is required for inference 
(Wooldridge 2013, p. 690), which should arguably be the case in this study where there is 50 
countries, N, and a small number of time periods, T.14  
Finally, following the discussion in Wooldridge (2013, p. 691), the inference was made robust 
to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation through clustered robust standard errors. When 
working with panel data, the use of cluster robust statistics is justified if N is much larger than 
T, which is the case in this study where there is 50 countries but only a maximum of 4 time 
periods. 
 
6 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
6.1 PANEL DATA RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the fixed effects estimates.15 Column 2 and 3 presents the estimates using 
people’s mean views of competition as the dependent variable, with the summary index of 
                                                          
14 Thanks to Johan Blomquist, Martin Nordin and Daniel Ekeblom for their helpful comments regarding the 
assumption of normally distributed idiosyncratic errors in panel data fixed effects analysis. 
15 Before engaging in a more careful panel data analysis, preliminary OLS regressions were run on a cross-
section of countries with the same four dependent variables and economic freedom and GDP per capita as 
independent variables, using data from the 2004-2007 survey wave and data on the explanatory variables from 
the same years. In most of these cases there was a significant relationship (at the 5% level) between economic 
freedom and people’s views on competition, with 2R  values varying between 0.17 and 0.45. For instance, it 
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economic freedom as the explanatory variable of interest in column 2, and the five areas of 
economic freedom as the explanatory variables of interest in column 3. Similarly, column 4 and 
5 presents the estimates with the percentage of people indicating that competition is mostly or 
completely desirable as dependent variable, and so on. 
The coefficients on the summary economic freedom index are never statistically significant. 
Thus, no support was found for the prediction that a higher overall level of economic freedom 
should be associated with greater support for competition. However, when looking at the 
separate areas of economic freedom, several significant relationships were found.  
Both mean views of competition and the percentage of people completely embracing or leaning 
towards the idea that competition is good (people responding 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 to the competition 
question) seems to be associated with the size of government, significant at the 5% and 1% 
level respectively. A one point increase in the score on the size of government area of economic 
freedom (implying less government involvement) is associated with a 0,08 point increase in 
people’s mean views on competition, and a 1.62 point increase in the percentage of people 
believing that competition is more desirable than it is undesirable, after controlling for the other 
areas of economic freedom, GDP, education, inequality, trust and aggregate time effects (and, 
of course, eliminating time-invariant unobserved factors). The increase in people’s mean views 
on competition is small, which is also true regarding the increase in the percentage of people 
embracing or leaning towards the view that competition is good, taking into consideration that 
the latter percentage is often above 80% (see Table A1 in the Appendix). As discussed in section 
3, if competition for government resources may not be perceived as particularly productive or 
benign compared to competition for customers in a market, then greater government allocation 
of resources could affect people’s support for competition negatively. But it is also quite 
possible that causality may instead go from greater support for competition to a smaller 
government, or it may go both ways (such causality issues will be discussed in section 7).  
Another finding is that a one point increase in the score on the regulation area is associated with 
a 1.2 point decrease in the percentage of people holding the view that competition is more 
desirable than it is undesirable (significant at the 5% level), again after having controlled for 
various other dimension of economic freedom, inequality et cetera. A higher score means less 
                                                          
was found that greater general economic freedom is quite substantially and significantly positively related to 
the percentage of people in a country leaning towards or completely agreeing with the view that competition is 
good. This is consistent with most of the theoretical discussion in section 3, in contrast to the results reported 
by Hayward & Kemmelmeier (2007). These very preliminary results are not reported here but can be obtained 
on request.  
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regulation of the economy, so this implies that less regulation, for instance a one point higher 
score, is associated with a decrease of around 1.2 points in the percentage of people fully 
embracing or leaning towards the view that competition is good. The effect is quite small, since 
this percentage of people is generally very big. The reason behind this association might be the 
fact that if regulation protects people from the possible negatives of competition and tend to 
correct market failures, then more regulation (i.e. a lower score on the regulation area) may 
make people more inclined to support the competitive process.  
A one point increase in the score on the legal system and property rights area is associated with 
a 1.14 point decrease in the percentage of people viewing competition as completely 
undesirable (significant at the 5% level). At first glance, this may seem like a small effect, but 
actually the effect is quite big, since the share of people expressing very negative views of 
competition is almost always very small (the mean percentage of people responding 10 to the 
competition question across all countries and time periods is 4.14). Thus, in societies were 
governments manage to ensure impartial courts and enforcement of contracts, and generally 
succeed in protecting people and their property rights, the group of people showing a very 
strong dislike for competition tend to be substantially smaller, after controlling for the other 
four areas of economic freedom, GDP, inequality, trust, education and aggregate time changes 
not otherwise included in the model (as well as eliminating time-constant unobserved factors). 
In contrast, in societies where the government is not as good at protecting property rights and 
ensuring an impartial legal system, the group of people showing a strong dislike for competition 
tend to be larger. Thus, some support was found for the expected positive effect of high scores 
on the legal system and property rights area on people’s competition endorsement, but only in 
the sense that the group of people expressing a strong dislike for competition shrinks when the 
score on the legal system area increases. One possible interpretation of this result is that the 
group of people feeling completely alienated from the economic system, and thus expressing a 
strong dislike for competition, may be larger when legal system is discriminatory and cheaters 
are rarely punished, since people may more easily interpret their precarious situation as a result 
of an unfair process of competition between people or companies. And conversely, this group 
may be smaller in societies where property rights are protected and contracts are enforced, 
because the competitive process may be perceived as basically fair and thus not as easily 
‘‘blamed’’ as the reason for people’s possible economic misfortunes.  
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Table 1 
Panel Data Results 
Dependent variable: Mean Views of 
Competition 
Mean Views of 
Competition 
Competition is Mostly  
Good 
Competition is Mostly  
Good 
Competition is Bad Competition is Bad Competition is Good Competition is Good 
Economic Freedom -0.0687038  
(0.0549652) 
 
 -0.9807697 
(0.8427632) 
 
 
-0.0135954 
(0.3842321) 
 -1.188926 
(0.9149829) 
 
Size of Government  0.0785643**  
(0.036961) 
 
 1.621786*** 
(0.5858352) 
 -0.3738283 
(0.3204108) 
 0.5322353  
(0.8627593) 
Legal System & Property Rights  0.0095224  
(0.0538535) 
 
 0.1524345  
(.6766537) 
 -1.138402** 
(0.520213) 
 -1.301078  
(1.852) 
Sound Money  -0.0303292  
(0.0199846) 
 -0.3041474  
(0.3361757) 
 0.0255826  
(0.0945824) 
 -0.6866325* 
(0.3684149) 
         
Freedom to Trade  -0.037383 
(0.0415403) 
 -0.5946827 
 (0.5597061) 
 -0.1637256  
(0.3181859) 
 -0.4371217  
(1.029859) 
         
Regulation 
 
 -0.0327957 
(0.041246) 
 -1.21562** 
(0.5867894) 
 0.4275394 
(0.3924927) 
 0.4733506 
(0.9477612) 
         
Log GDP per capita -0.3111512 -0.2328099 -4.733167* -2.824291 0.0723395 0.6848546 -3.536087 -2.330724 
 (0.2208025) (0.304052) 
 
(2.755551) (4.445353) (1.363566) (1.898335) (4.757602) (5.192572) 
Net Gini -0.0120044 -0.017505 -0.1457676 -0.212675 0.2031316* 0.1724316 -0.1347731 -0.3008407 
 (0.0142127) (0.0154124) 
 
(0.2003359) (0.2292363) (0.1106228) (0.106123) (0.2964029) (0.3153426) 
Trust -0.0075527 -0.0094152  -0.0609485  -0.1035906  -0.0229603  -0.0302214  -0.193803  -0.2252895 
 (0.0065412) (0.0066684) (0.077523) (0.0720104) (0.0435158) (0.0390136) (0.1956919) (0.1954221) 
         
Education -0.024764 -0.0075911 -0.3228202 -0.0765577 -0.1900283 -0.3551641 -0.1996714 -0.0077628 
 (0.0849978) (0.0810555) (1.342276) (1.273495) (0.4505262) (0.4534001) (1.389311) (1.148854) 
         
Wave 2 -0.1813924  
(0.1096968) 
-0.2025564*  
(0.1016989) 
-1.9808  
(1.752521) 
-2.085232 
(1.488369) 
-0.3714818  
(0.5453823) 
0.2296174 
(0.698464) 
-3.61164*  
(1.953615) 
-3.804818**  
(1.845514) 
         
Wave 3 -0.1870508  
(0.1271964) 
-0.1958397 
 (0.1227133) 
-2.410658 
(2.145336) 
-2.302774 
(1.908326) 
0.8928725 
(0.7541191) 
1.341238*  
(0.7904542) 
-1.529014  
(2.130465) 
-1.6019  
(2.150275) 
         
Wave 4 -0.2976936 
(0.1845308) 
-0.3990191** 
(0.1961117) 
-2.547757  
(3.02266) 
-4.203148 
(3.313934) 
-0.2131511  
(1.045325) 
0.0086673  
(1.076119) 
-7.48398*** 
(2.710791) 
-8.844452*** 
(2.870349) 
         
2R  (within) 
0.3581 0.3891 0.2934 0.3574 0.1461 0.287 0.2936 0.3131 
         
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 
         
Observations per Group 2 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 
         
Groups/Clusters 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
         
         
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; and *** significance at 1%. 
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Finally, a one point increase in the score on the sound money area is associated with a 0.69 
point decrease in the percentage of people responding that competition is very good (significant 
at the 10% level). This is not consistent with the theoretical discussion, and it is not clear how 
this result should be interpreted. It could be that a lower score on sound money, for instance 
because of high inflation, might make some people more competitive (if this is necessary for 
survival in an unstable and unpredictable economy). But, since the mean percentage of people 
responding 1 to the competition question is 25.6, the effect is small. 
The controls are almost never significant. However, when studying the share of people 
believing that competition is completely undesirable, and using overall economic freedom as 
the explanatory variable of interest, Net Gini is significant at the 10% level, with a 1 point 
increase in the Net Gini being associated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in the percentage 
of people believing that competition is bad. Furthermore, when studying the share of people 
leaning towards or completely embracing the view that competition is good, and again using 
overall economic freedom as the explanatory variable of interest, the negative coefficient on 
GDP per capita is significant at the 10% level.  
The coefficients on the time dummy variables are statistically significant (at various levels) in 
7 out of 24 cases, and they are often nontrivial in size. The time dummy variables would capture 
the effects of any factors affecting people’s views of competition that are changing in a similar 
way for the different countries between the survey waves. Overall, the reasons for the results 
on the time dummy variables are not totally clear, but some tentative interpretations are 
possible. For instance, the negative and significant coefficients on the dummy variables for 
wave 2 in column 3, 8 and 9 could indicate that people’s support for the market economy and 
thus their competition endorsement generally tended to decline during 1994-1998, after having 
reached particularly high levels globally during the years 1989-1993 (i.e. the years of the 
omitted category) because of the fall of communism and apparent ‘‘victory’’ of capitalism. 
However, this is of course mere speculation, and the negative and significant coefficients on 
the dummy variables for wave 4 (in column 3, 8 and 9) may seem harder to explain.  
Table 1 follow Wooldridge (2013, p. 469) in reporting the R-squared based on the within 
transformation, which can be thought of as the variation through time in the dependent variable 
explained through the time variation of the independent variables. The R-squared values vary 
between 0.15 and 0.39. In the cases including the five areas of economic freedom (the only 
cases with significant coefficients on the explanatory variables of interest), the values on the R-
squared vary between 0.29 and 0.39. 
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6.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The panel data analysis includes controls for some country-level variables, eliminates time-
invariant unobserved factors (at the country-level) and further accounts for aggregate time 
changes. But since many individual-level variables are not controlled for in the panel data 
analysis (for instance, people’s subjective health and/or employment status), a sensitivity 
analysis was conducted to see if the results hold when also including individual-level data. The 
sensitivity analysis is conducted using a cross-section of individual-level data from the 2004-
2008 wave of the World Values Survey (2009), together with country-level data from the same 
sources as in the panel data analysis. The advantages of using panel data are lost but, because 
of differences in the data availability when using this data structure, there is a simultaneous 
gain in examining a somewhat different set of countries (see Table A3 in the Appendix) as well 
as the possibility to control for individual-level characteristics. The comparable results from the 
panel data analysis are mainly the ones from column 2, 3 (and possibly also 4 and 5) in Table 
1, since the regression results reported in the other columns in Table 1 uses the percentage of 
people in a country with extremely negative and extremely positive views of competition as the 
dependent variable, and these would not be easily comparable with the results of this sensitivity 
analysis. 
The dependent variable is the individual-level response to the competition question also used 
to construct the various dependent variables in the panel data analysis, taken from the 2004-
2008 wave of the World Values Survey (2009) and reverse coded so that a higher value implies 
a more positive view of competition. In other words, after recoding the data, 10 is the most 
positive view and 1 is the most negative view.16 The independent variables of interest are again 
the summary Economic Freedom index and the five areas of economic freedom (Fraser Institute 
2012), and the country-level controls are GDP per capita (PPP) (Heston, Summers & Aten 
2012) and inequality (Solt 2009). The individual-level controls, constructed from the 2004-
2008 wave of the World Values Survey (2009) data set, include a female dummy variable, a 
dummy variable for being unemployed, a protestant dummy variable, the respondent’s age, the 
income decile in which the respondent includes her/his household, education level, subjective 
                                                          
16 Just as in the country-level panel data analysis, the survey data were collected in different years. Therefore 
the individual-level data were ‘’matched’’ with country-level data from the same year. For instance, since the 
survey of individuals was conducted in Sweden in 2006, the data on Swedish GDP, economic freedom and 
inequality are also from 2006.  
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health, subjective happiness and trust.17 A detailed description of all these individual-level 
control variables can be found in the Appendix. Furthermore, time dummy variables are added 
for the years included in this survey wave.18  
Ordinary least squares (OLS) is used on a cross section of tens of thousands of individuals from 
many different countries. OLS picks estimates in order to minimize the sum of the squares of 
the residuals (Wooldridge 2013, p. 69). The data consists of groups of observations, i.e. the 50 
country samples (also called ‘‘clusters’’), and it is quite likely that outcomes within the included 
countries (i.e. within the clusters) are correlated (Wooldridge 2013, pp. 482-483). For instance, 
if two Swedish individuals are randomly picked, they are likely to hold more similar beliefs 
than two randomly selected individuals from Sweden and Uruguay, i.e. the observations are 
non-independent. Neglecting this fact can lead to the underestimation of the standard errors and 
incorrectly make effects significant (Hayward & Kemmelmeier 2007, pp. 372-373). In order to 
account for this, clustered standard errors are used (see Wooldridge 2013, pp. 483), just as in 
the panel data analysis.19 In the context of individual-level data collected from various states in 
a single year or across various years, Primo, Jacobsmeier & Milyo (2007, pp. 451-452) write 
that ‘‘50 clusters are more than sufficient’’ for valid inference using clustered standard errors 
(which also corrects for heteroskedasticity). The 50 clusters included in the data, i.e. the 50 
countries, should thus be enough.20  
The first regression results in this sensitivity analysis indicated that the freedom to trade had a 
negative impact on people’s support for competition, with a negative coefficient of -0.19, 
significant at the 10% level (not reported here). This is consistent with the signs of the 
comparable coefficients in the panel data analysis (although they are not significant in the panel 
data analysis). As mentioned earlier, it is quite possible that if low-wage workers are 
particularly vulnerable to the possible negatives of free trade, then a higher score on this index 
                                                          
17 Initially, in order to control for the respondent’s position in the workplace hierarchy, the analysis included a 
dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if the respondent considers himself/herself as either an employer, 
foreman or supervisor on the job. This variable was included in order to control for the possibility that one’s 
position in the occupational hierarchy might be related to one’s values (see for instance Kohn et al. 1986). 
Because of a lack of data for many countries, leading to a lower number of clusters than recommended (see 
the later discussion), this variable was dropped. 
18 i.e. 2004. 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, with 2004 as the reference category. 
19 Another alternative would be to use a multi-level mixed effects regression technique to estimate the effects 
of various individual-level and country-level variables on the views of competition (see Steele 2008; Hayward & 
Kemmelmeier 2007, p. 373). The clustered error technique used in the sensitivity analysis is a straightforward 
alternative to multilevel models (Primo, Jacobsmeier & Milyo 2007). 
20 Through personal communication with the authors, David M. Primo (August 31, 2013) confirmed that their 
technique for clustering should work fine not only in the context of 50 states but also in the context of 50 
countries. 
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area may lower the support for competition among this group in particular. In order to examine 
the possibility that the effect of free trade on people’s competition endorsement might depend 
on household income, this sensitivity analysis includes an interaction between the scale of 
income, i.e. the income decile in which the respondent includes her/his household, and the 
freedom to trade (see Wooldridge 2013, pp. 190-192).  
Since the sample is large, the normality assumption regarding the errors is not necessary for 
inference (Westerlund 2005, pp. 99-100, 134-135, 147). Studying the correlations between the 
independent variables did not indicate any major problem of multicollinearity. Finally, as 
already pointed out, the clustered standard errors allow for heteroskedasticity and ‘‘cluster 
correlation’’ (Wooldridge 2013, p. 483).  
The results from this sensitivity analysis is reported in Table 2. Because of space limitations, 
the coefficients on the time dummy variables are not reported. As can be seen, the results largely 
confirm the results of the panel data analysis reported in column 2 and 3 (as well as 4 and 5) in 
Table 1. The coefficient on the summary index of economic freedom is not significant, 
confirming the results of the panel data analysis. Less government involvement, i.e. a higher 
score on the size of government area of economic freedom, is again associated with greater 
support for competition (significant at the 5% level).21 
As mentioned above the sensitivity analysis includes an interaction between income scale, i.e. 
the income decile in which the respondent includes her/his household, and freedom to trade. 
The results suggest that for people in the lowest income decile (income decile 1), a one point 
increase in the score on the free trade area is associated with a decrease in the support for 
competition by 0.33 points,22 after controlling for the various other areas of economic freedom, 
GDP, inequality, aggregate time changes and several individual characteristics. This is a 
nontrivial effect, larger than the negative effect of being a female and much larger than the 
positive effects of a one point increase in education or subjective health. This coefficient is 
significant at the 1% level when rerunning the regression as recommended by Wooldridge 
(2013, p. 192).23   
                                                          
21 The coefficient on regulation is negative in this analysis, just as in the significant (but maybe not fully 
comparable) case of column 5 in Table 1, but it is not significant. 
22 -0.3751787 + 0.040816(1) = -0.3343627 
23 These results are not reported here, but can be obtained on request from the author. 
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Table 2 
Cross-sectional results 
 Dependent variable: Views of Competition Views of Competition 
 Constant 7.697813***  
(0.9732954) 
 
8.350961*** 
(1.19029) 
 
 Individual-level parameters   
 Age  0.0038713 
(0.0017687)** 
0.0046762***  
(0.001569) 
    
 Education Level 0.0798935***  
(0.0141061)  
 
0.0875249***  
(0.0136133)  
 
 Scale of Income 0.0154907  
(0.0182849) 
 
-0.2925685***  
(0.0963151) 
 
 Female -0.2395735***  
(0.0296145) 
 
-0.2433439***  
(0.0293545) 
 
 Protestant 0.1882908** 
(0.0835449) 
 
0.2387555*** 
(0.0787375) 
 
 Happiness 0.0672692* 
(0.0394954) 
 
0.0823112** 
(0.0384125) 
 
 Health 0.0956213***  
(0.0229851) 
 
0.0914953***  
(0.0193592) 
 
 Unemployed -0.1432616  
(0.0933548) 
 
-.1000372  
(.0797168) 
 
 Trust -0.0339488 -.021188 
  (0.0552922) (.0486949) 
  
Country-level parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 Economic Freedom 0.0380405  
   (0.1536364) 
 
 
 Size of Government  0.1376768** 
    
 
(0.0571184) 
 Legal structure & property rights  
 
 
 
-0.0004901  
(0.0878701) 
                       Sound money  
 
 
0.1103714  
(0.0873707) 
 Freedom to trade  
 
 
-0.3751787***  
(0.107665) 
 Regulation  -0.0682194 
    
 
(0.0722256) 
 Log GDP per capita (PPP) -0.2053612* -0.1441157 
  (0.1025035) 
 
(0.1258842) 
 Net Gini -0.0031927 -0.0026766 
   (0.0067022) 
 
(0.0077251) 
  
Interaction parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 Freedom to trade ×Scale of Income  0.040816*** 
    (0.0125293) 
    
 2R  
0.0263 0.0327 
    
 Observations 49675 49675 
     
 Clusters 50 50 
    
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; and *** significance at 1%. 
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On the opposite end of the income scale, a one point increase in the free trade slightly increases 
support for competition by 0.03 points,24 but this effect is not even close to being significant. 
Finally, using the mean income scale of the sample, 4.57, the coefficient becomes -0.19 
(significant at the 10% level).25 These results are consistent with the idea that free trade and the 
ensuing competition from abroad cause members of low-income households in particular to 
view competition as less desirable.  
Many of the coefficients of the individual-level controls are statistically significant, and they 
suggest that individuals that should presumably be better able to compete successfully (for 
instance healthier, more educated and happier individuals) are more supportive of competition. 
Causality may also go the other way, for instance from more competitive individuals to higher 
education, or they could both be caused by a third factor. It should further be noted that in 
column 3 of Table 2, because of the inclusion of the interaction term between scale of income 
and free trade, the coefficient on scale of income measures the effect on competition 
endorsement when the score on the freedom to trade area is zero, which should not be given a 
literal interpretation.26  
 
As is often the case when studying individual-level data, the R-squared is small.27 A small R-
squared implies that there are many factors affecting people’s views of competitions (the 
dependent variable) that one has failed to account for. But, this does not necessarily mean that 
there is a correlation between the explanatory variables and the factors captured by the error 
(Wooldridge 2013, pp. 77, 192-193). Still, in this analysis, it is certainly possible that these 
unobserved factors are actually correlated with the explanatory variables. Since this might be 
the case, it could be a good idea to interpret the results with some caution. 
 
7 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Does economic freedom affect people’s views of competition? Neither the results from the 
country-level panel data analysis nor the cross-sectional sensitivity analysis linking individual-
level and country-level data lend any support to the idea that greater overall economic freedom, 
as measured by the summary index, should be associated with higher support for competition. 
                                                          
24 -0.3751787 + 0.040816(10) = 0.0329813. 
25 -0.3751787 + 0.040816(4.57) = -0.18864958. 
26 The lowest score on the freedom to trade area in the sample is 5.26 (see Table A2 in the Appendix). 
27 Thanks to Martin Nordin who pointed out that the R-squared is expected to be small when studying 
individual-level data. 
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The lack of statistical significance also means that we cannot confirm the finding of Hayward 
& Kemmelmeier (2007) that general economic freedom is associated with lower support for 
competition. This suggests that the use of broad measures of economic freedom does not help 
us much when examining the factors influencing people’s views of competition. 
Examining the separate areas of economic freedom indicates that a smaller government is 
associated with greater support for competition, although the coefficients are not very large. 
This result is also confirmed in the sensitivity analysis. Furthermore, in the country-level panel 
data analysis less regulation of the economy is associated with a (small) decrease in the 
percentage of people holding the view that competition is more desirable than it is undesirable, 
and there is further a quite substantial negative relationship between the legal system and 
protection of property rights area of economic freedom and the percentage of people regarding 
competition as completely undesirable. There also seems to be a negative relationship between 
the percentage of people responding that competition is very good and the score on the sound 
money area, although the coefficient is small. Furthermore, when examining the cross-section 
in the sensitivity analysis, free trade seems to be negatively associated with competition 
endorsement among individuals from low-income households in particular. The coefficients on 
free trade are negative also in the comparable cases of the panel data analysis, but they are not 
significant. One could speculate whether significance would be obtained also in the panel data 
analysis if only low-income respondents were included. 
While controlling for various variables, including aggregate time effects as well as eliminating 
time-invariant country-specific characteristic, the panel data method used in this paper does not 
offer a solution to the problem of omitted variables that change over time. For instance, the 
relationship between a smaller government and higher support for competition doesn’t 
necessarily imply that a smaller government causes a higher support for competition, since it is 
possible that both the size of government and people’s support for competition is caused by a 
third factor not included in the analysis. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, lack of data made 
the only reasonable option not to include lagged values on the explanatory variables. There 
exists the possibility of reverse causation. To return to the abovementioned example, it is clearly 
possible that a greater support for competition causes a smaller government, and not the other 
way around. Or the causality may go both ways.28 While this may be the case in some of the 
                                                          
28 If there is in fact a causal relationship from larger government to a lower support for competition, this would 
be in line with the theoretical discussion suggesting that in societies with greater government allocation of 
resources, people might think of competition as a destructive force occurring mainly between interest groups 
or individuals trying to gain a larger share of existing subsidies, while in less government-dominated societies, 
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statistically significant relationships, it could probably be argued that at least a few of the 
findings may tentatively be interpreted as causal. When considering the negative relationship 
between the legal system and protection of property rights area and the percentage of people 
expressing very negative views of competition found in the panel data analysis, the former 
could probably be assumed to cause the latter. It is hard to see how an increase in the often 
small group viewing competition as completely undesirable would impair the legal system and 
the protection of property rights. It seems equally hard to think of any omitted variable that 
change over time that is affecting both the legal system area of economic freedom and the size 
of the group of people expressing very negative views of competition. 
The finding that less regulation is associated with a smaller percentage of people leaning 
towards or completely embracing the view that competition is desirable could possibly also be 
interpreted as causal, since it doesn’t seem very plausible that a smaller percentage of people 
leaning towards or completely embracing the view that competition is good would cause less 
regulation. But again, it is possible that both variables might be caused by some other omitted 
time-varying factor, although it might be hard to think of any such variable. 
Furthermore, the (tentative) finding of the sensitivity analysis that freer trade is associated with 
lower support for competition among low-income households in particular could possibly be 
interpreted as causal, with the effect going from free trade to lower support for competition. It 
is hard to see how low support for competition might possibly lead to freer trade. But, again, 
this is a cross-sectional analysis and the R-squared is low (as expected when examining 
individual-level data), and again it is possible that some omitted factor causes both freer trade 
and lower support for competition.  
If the causal interpretations are correct and if upholding an impartial legal system and protecting 
property rights leads to a substantially smaller percentage of people holding unambiguously 
negative beliefs about competition, then this might be one way in which policymakers can 
reduce anti-capitalist sentiments among (some groups) of the population and possibly further 
undermine the electoral support for populist parties. No other included variable, including 
inequality, seems to have any significant impact on the prevalence of this particular view of 
competition when using the five separate areas of economic freedom as the main explanatory 
variables of interest.29 This suggests that failure in ensuring fair and predictable rules of the 
                                                          
people may think of competition as mostly occurring between companies in the marketplace and thus as a 
force for good. 
29 Except for one of the time dummy variables. 
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economic system matters more for the spread of a strong competition aversion than, for 
instance, unequal outcomes.30 It would be interesting to see if this result holds in future research. 
The other effects of the separate areas may seem too small to be relevant for policymakers, even 
if causality could actually be established. However, the sensitivity analysis tentatively suggest 
that if governments intend to increase support for competition among individuals at the bottom 
of the income latter (in particular), they should probably protect them against, or compensate 
them for, the possible negatives of free trade (if simply reducing free trade may not seem like 
a particularly desirable option). 
It should be pointed out that people in different cultures might interpret the competition question 
in different ways. For instance, it might be that people in individualist cultures think of 
competition as occurring primarily between individuals but that people in collectivist cultures 
tend to think of competition between groups (Hayward & Kemmelmeier 2007, p. 391). If this 
is the case, then the dependent variables are in fact measuring quite different things in different 
cultures, which could then help explain why some of the theoretical discussion may seem 
misguided in light of the results.  
Furthermore, as suggested by the interaction effect included in the sensitivity analysis, it is 
possible that different groups may respond in different ways to an increase in economic 
freedom. A more careful analysis at the individual-level, perhaps including additional 
interaction effects, would be a good idea for further exploration of these issues.  
Another possibility is that people accept different moral standards depending on the specific 
‘‘social sphere’’ of society. For instance, the same individual may simultaneously believe that 
selfishness and pure utility-maximization (and a purely competitive attitude) is fully acceptable 
and even desirable when selling his/her house to a stranger in the marketplace or applying for 
a job, but not when he/she is interacting with co-workers on the job or when taking care of 
friends and family (see Rothstein 2011, pp. 18-23). Thus, it is possible that competition might 
be widely accepted in some spheres of life but not in others. This seems consistent with the 
research reviewed earlier, suggesting that people may generally act selfishly in some types of 
situations but care about fairness in others (Fehr, Naef & Schmidt 2006, p. 1912). It might be 
that economic freedom affects people’s support for competition, but only in specific contexts 
                                                          
30 However, as can be seen in column 6 of Table 1, the coefficient on inequality is significant when using the 
summary economic freedom index as the main explanatory variable of interest. This significance disappears 
when using the five separate areas. 
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(such as in the marketplace). Thus, a question about people’s general views of competition 
might not suffice, and a more careful context-dependent analysis might be warranted.31 
Finally, the use of a summary index as well as the five areas of economic freedom may be quite 
blunt, and it is possible that it would be more appropriate to choose the most theoretically 
relevant variables from the forty-two components behind the five areas (and the summary 
index) of economic freedom. Nevertheless, the results from the panel data analysis suggest that 
different areas of economic freedom may help predicting people’s views of competition. And 
while the low R-squared values in Table 2 should of course be kept in mind, the results of the 
sensitivity analysis further suggest that some dimensions of economic freedom may play a role 
in determining people’s competition endorsement even after controlling for individual 
characteristics. However, for the statistically significant relationships found in this paper, a 
more careful causal analysis is needed. Further research, for instance using more detailed data 
and instrumental variables, might be warranted.32  
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9 APPENDIX 
9.1 INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES 
Below is a description of the individual-level control variables included in the sensitivity 
analysis. Many, but not all, of the variables are included by Hayward & Kemmelmeier (2007) 
when studying individual-level predictors of people’s views of competition. Just as the data 
on the dependent variable, all of these variables are included in, or constructed from, the 
2004-2008 wave of the World Values Survey (2009) data set. 
 
- Female. This variable takes on the value of 1 if the respondent is a female, and 0 otherwise. 
- Age. This variable denotes the age of the respondent. 
- Unemployed. This variable takes on the value of 1 if the respondent considers 
himself/herself unemployed, and 0 otherwise. 
- Protestant. Following the discussion in Hayward & Kemmelmeier (2007, p. 367-369, 384) 
about the idea that Protestant culture is supposed to be associated with support for 
competition and free markets, a protestant dummy is included. This dummy variable takes on 
the value of 1 if the respondent considers herself/himself to be a Protestant, and 0 otherwise.  
- Scale of Income. Following Hayward & Kemmelmeier (2007, p. 383), higher income is 
predicted to be related to greater endorsement of competition. Thus, an income variable is 
added. This variable measures in which income decile, from 1 (lowest decile) to 10 (highest 
decile), that the respondent includes her/his household.  
- Education Level. This variable measures the highest educational level attained (or expected 
to be completed) by the respondent, from 1 (‘‘Inadequately completed elementary 
education’’) to 8 (‘‘University-level education, with degree’’). 
- Health. A variable measuring the respondent’s subjective state of health. This is the original 
variable included in the World Values Survey (2009) data set, but it has been recoded so that 
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a higher value implies better subjective health and thus ranges from 1 (Very poor) to 5 (Very 
good). 
- Happiness. This variable measures how happy the respondent considers himself/herself, 
from 1 (Not at all happy) to 4 (Very happy). As the previous variable, this is the original 
World Values Survey (2009) variable but recoded so that a higher value implies greater 
happiness. 
- Trust. Takes on the value of 1 if the respondent believes that ‘‘most people can be trusted’’. 
 
9.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND INCLUDED COUNTRIES 
 
Table A1 
Panel data analysis descriptive statistics 
 
Table A2 
Sensitivity analysis descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable Source Mean Std. dev.   Min   Max 
Mean Views of Competition World Values Survey & European Values Study Group (2013)       7.3       0.59       6         9 
Competition is Mostly Good World Values Survey & European Values Study Group (2013)   80.61       7.4    62.8       95 
Competition is Good World Values Survey & European Values Study Group (2013)     25.6    12.41      4.7    67.3 
Competition is Bad World Values Survey & European Values Study Group (2013)     4.14        3.15    0.2       15 
Trust World Values Survey & European Values Study Group (2013)     30.7        15.9    2.8    74.2 
Net Gini Solt (2009)     34.2        9.45  20.97    64.8 
Log GDP per capita (PPP) Heston, Summers & Aten (2012)     9.42          0.9    6.7  10.85 
Education Barro & Lee’s (2010)     9.06         2.11  3.44    12.9 
Size of Government Fraser Institute (2012)     5.44        1.66  1.46    8.33 
Legal System & Property Rights Fraser Institute (2012)     6.83    1.67  2.93    9.62 
Sound Money Fraser Institute (2012)       7.5    2.54       0    9.84 
Freedom to Trade Fraser Institute (2012)     7.53        1.48  2.19    9.66 
Regulation Fraser Institute (2012)     6.31      1.23  2.19    8.62 
Summary Economic Freedom Fraser Institute (2012)     6.72      1.16    3.55    8.65 
Variable Source Mean Std. dev. Min   Max 
Views of Competition World Values Survey (2009)   7.32     2.5    1      10 
Age World Values Survey (2009) 41.15  16.37  15      98 
Education Level World Values Survey (2009)     4.4  2.34    1        8 
Income Scale World Values Survey (2009)   4.57  2.3  1       10 
Female World Values Survey (2009)   0.53  0.5  0         1 
Unemployed World Values Survey (2009)   0.1  0.3  0         1 
Protestant World Values Survey (2009)   0.2 0.4  0         1 
Happiness World Values Survey (2009)   3.09   0.73  1         4 
Health World Values Survey (2009)   3.85   0.85  1         5 
Trust World Values Survey (2009)   0.23   0.42  0        1 
Log GDP per capita (PPP) Heston, Summers & Aten (2012)        9 1.09  6.3   10.85 
Net Gini Solt (2009) 38.19 9.32 23.2     63.5 
Size of Government Fraser Institute (2012)     6.6       1 3.73     9.08 
Legal System & Property Rights Fraser Institute (2012)        6   1.31   3.3   9.07 
Sound Money Fraser Institute (2012)   8.2   1.12 5.3     9.77 
Freedom to Trade Fraser Institute (2012)   7.35   0.93 5.26     9.52 
Regulation Fraser Institute (2012)     6.8 0.86 4.5   8.86 
Summary Economic Freedom Fraser Institute (2012)        7 0.65 5.74   9.03 
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Table A3 
List of included countries 
AlbaniaF HungaryF SerbiaS 
ArgentinaF Hong KongS SlovakiaF 
AustraliaF, S IndiaF, S SloveniaF, S 
AustriaF IranS South AfricaF, S 
BangladeshF IrelandF South KoreaF, S 
BelgiumF IndonesiaS SpainF, S 
BrazilF, S ItalyF, S SwedenF, S 
BulgariaF, S JapanF, S SwitzerlandF, S 
CanadaF, S 
ChileF, S 
LatviaF 
LithuaniaF 
          TaiwanF, S 
TurkeyF, S 
ChinaF, S 
ColombiaS 
MalaysiaS  
MaliS 
Trinidad and TobagoS 
UkraineF, S 
CroatiaF MexicoF, S United KingdomF, S 
CyprysS MoldovaS United StatesF, S 
Czech RepublicF MoroccoF, S UruguayF, S 
DenmarkF 
EgyptS 
NetherlandsF, S 
New ZealandF 
VenezuelaF 
VietnamS 
EstoniaF 
EthiopiaS 
NorwayF, S 
PeruF, S 
ZambiaS 
FinlandF, S PhilippinesF  
FranceF, S 
GeorgiaS 
PolandF, S 
PortugalF 
 
GermanyF, S 
GhanaS 
GuatemalaS 
RomaniaF, S  
RwandaS  
RussiaF, S 
 
 
  Notes: F = included in the fixed effects panel data analysis. S = included in the sensitivity 
analysis.   
